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In contrast to providing standard reminders about remembering household budgets, 
does asking survey respondents about their discretionary income and its use affect 
their voting responses in a national advisory referendum survey? We explore this 
question using U.S.  household data from a unique set  of multi-mode  random samples 
(telephone and Internet surveys), and an  advisory referendum concerning  the Kyoto 
Protocol. The contingent valuation method is applied to estimate household willing- 
ness to pay (WTP) for a split-sample treatment: respondents who only received a 
standard reminder of  household budgets (control group) versus respondents who 
received two mental accounting-type  questions on discretionary income and its uses 
(treatment group).  Results indicate that the  treatment simcantly  influences  voting 
responses and lowers estimated household WTP. 
Key words:  budget constraint, contingent  valuation, Kyoto Protocol, mental accounts, 
referendum 
Introduction 
Given critical information gaps in a variety of  cost-benefit analyses, natural resource 
damage and other planning assessments, the demand for nonmarket values for changes 
in environmental goods persists (Bishop, 2003; List et al., 2004). But concerns also 
persist that stated preference approaches, such as the survey-based contingent valua- 
tion (CV) method, may be subject to hypothetical bias, especially in the case of complex 
environmental goods or policy changes (e.g., concerning climate change or biodiversity). 
While there are various strategies for improving the validity of CV estimates, such as 
advocating the use of  referendum formats, and controlling for response uncertainty, 
there remains much we don't know and considerable room for improved understanding 
of preferences for complex environmental goods.' 
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This empirical investigation uses a national (U.S.) advisory referendum CV format, 
in which the good being valued is the reduction of global warming through the ratifi- 
cation of the  Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is a complex international treaty which, 
to take effect, required ratification by at  least 55 developed countries and at  least a 55% 
reduction in the total 1990 carbon dioxide  emission^.^ The Protocol imposes binding 
emission reductions in greenhouse gases for developed countries, with no concomitant 
obligations for developing countries (e.g., no restrictions on increases in emissions for 
rapidly growing economies such as India and China). The Protocol requires the partici- 
pating industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions below  1990 
levels based on their varying targets during the period from 2008 to 2012. 
With implementation of the Protocol beginning in early 2005, significant questions 
about its effectiveness remain. As the largest industrialized economy in the world, 
particular concern surrounds U.S. withdrawal from the  treaty. The issue of bringing the 
United States  back into serious international negotiations (on a revised Kyoto Protocol 
or some variant thereof) remains important for future advancements in international 
coordination on global climate ~hange.~  Thus, the issue of accurately assessing the 
degree of U.S. public support for the Kyoto Protocol remains a relevant informational 
input. 
Given this context, this study investigates the issue of  possible budget constraint 
effects in referendum CV responses. Within the broader CV validity debate, there has 
been considerable concern that respondents may not give full consideration to their 
ability to pay (e.g., Arrow et  al., 1993).  Conversely, the credibility of results from a valu- 
ation study  would be enhanced if there were evidence indicating respondents had taken 
into account "their personal circumstances and constraints" (Bateman and Langford, 
1997, p. 1215). Failure to consider budget constraints is viewed as a source of possible 
upward bias (Kemp and Maxwell, 1993; Willis and Garrod, 1993). To reduce possible 
"budget constraint bias," Mitchell and Carson (1989) suggest the use of  standard 
reminders to encourage respondents to fully consider their incomes. Mixed evidence has 
accumulated concerning the effect of explicit budget constraint (and substitute goods) 
reminders. Also at  issue is what the relevant income is in different circumstances, and 
whether "mental accounts" explain responses (Bateman and Langford, 1997). 
To further our understanding of possible budget constraint effects, the objective of 
this study is to investigate the effect on referendum voting of having respondents answer 
two mental accounting-type questions. A unique aspect of the study is the inclusion of 
both national (U.S.) telephone and Internet samples using a web-based survey. In addi- 
tion to providing all respondents with a standard budget reminder as part of the  elicita- 
tion question, we exposed a split-sample treatment group to two questions asking them 
to consider: (a)  the proportion of monthly income available for optional uses after main 
expenses, such as housing; and (b)  the proportion of their monthly income available for 
Following a long series of extended international negotiations, as of  February 16,2005, the Kyoto Protocol was to take 
effect on its 128 parties. (For the announcement, refer to the United Nations website.) Only four industrial countries (out of 
59) did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but these four (including  the United States)  account for one-third of total greenhouse 
gas emissions globally. Thus, it  is argued by a number of sources that the absence of  U.S. participation, which withdrew its 
support in 1998, may severely limit the overall effectiveness of the treaty (for further discussion, see Li et al., 2004). 
Congressional  debate on the U.S. stance on requiring emission  reductions for greenhouse gases remains open. As a contin- 
uing effort to raise bipartisan concern, Senators John McCain (R)  and Joe Liebennan (Dl have recently reintroduced the 
Climate Stewardship Act, with modest U.S. emission reduction targets, for vote in the U.S. Senate. However, the original 
bill lost 55 to 43 in 2003, and it is expected to face an uphill struggle in 2005 as  well (Lander, 2005). 352  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
contributions to environmental causes. These questions encourage respondents to 
construct mental accounts, first in terms of discretionary income for optional uses and 
then in terms of the use of this discretionary income for environmental causes. Results 
indicate that, relative to the standard reminder control group, the mental accounts treat- 
ment significantly affects voting responses and lowers estimated household willingness 
to pay (WTP). 
Background and Literature Review 
The issue of meaningful consideration of budget constraints gained some topical impor- 
tance in CV research when it was emphasized by the blue-ribbon panel established by 
the  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Arrow et al., 1993). In 
the Panel's critique and review of the CV method for estimating passive use values for 
inclusion in natural resource damage assessments, a number of problems associated 
with CV studies were noted to be of  particular concern. These included the common 
failure to provide adequate reminders to survey respondents of available substitutes  and 
budget constraints. For WTP elicitation questions, the Panel recommended explicitly: 
"the payment vehicle must be described fully and clearly with the relevant budget 
constraint emphasized" (Arrow et al., 1993, p. 4610). 
Subsequent to the NOAA Panel report, a number of  studies have investigated the 
effect of explicit reminders of budgets and substitutes  on CVvaluation responses. Loomis, 
Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory (1994) found no significant effect on WTP responses for 
protecting old-growth forest. They used a split-sample design for the reminder treat- 
ment, and a dichotomous choice (DC-CV) format. Adopting a similar format for valuing 
wetlands preservation, Whitehead and  Blomquist (1995)  found that information on a set 
of possible substitutes  (complements)  had a significant negative (positive) effect on WTP 
responses. They argued that information on substitutes and complements should be 
included in any CV study, especially those involving lesser-known goods. 
Kotchen and Reiling (1999) attempted to replicate the Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and 
Gregory (1994) study for "lesser-known" public goods of preserving Peregrine falcons 
and short-nose sturgeons. They used a referendum DC-CV format and an experimental 
sample design, stratified by the species protected, the information treatment for the 
substitute, and the  budget constraint reminder. The authors found that information on 
substitutes and budget constraints had no significant effect on mean WTP but did 
improve estimation efficiency. Whitehead and  Blomquist (1999)  challenged this conclu- 
sion by questioning the statistical performance of the Kotchen and Reiling models (e.g., 
specification and absence of a significant bid effect in one case). Hailu, Adamowicz, and 
Boxall (2000)  conducted a multi-program CV study on ecosystem conservation. To 
provide a direct reminder of budget constraints, they asked the  respondents to calculate 
various costs of different combinations of programs. While they found a strong comple- 
mentary effect among environmental programs, whether respondents considered their 
own  budget constraints remains ambiguous. 
An alternative  to simply providing a split-sample informational treatment in  the  form 
of  a reminder is to more actively invoke "meaningful consideration" of  a budget con- 
straint. Kemp and Maxwell (1993) explored a budget context for CV responses through 
a "top-down disaggregation" approach. Through mall-intercept surveys, they first 
asked respondents to answer an open-ended (OE) question for the top-level category of Li et al.  Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  353 
"national social concerns." Next, respondents were asked a sequence of  percentage allo- 
cations across different groups of  concerns, and for five layers of  disaggregation. WTP 
for the category of  interest was then identified (e.g., minimizing risk of oil spills).  Kemp 
and Maxwell found that their top-down disaggregation approach produced distinctly 
lower WTP for a good  when compared to a single-focus approach, which elicits an 
OE-WTP response solely for the same good. An issue with the results of their study, and 
their approach, is that by the nature of their design, there are actually multiple public 
goods changing at once (Smith, 1993). The question is how much of  this difference in 
WTP responses might be due to differences in the two formats in forcing respondents 
to meaningfully consider budget constraints. 
One approach for examining budget constraint effects is provided by Bateman and 
Langford (1997)  in their OE elicitation format CV study of  a recreation site. Prior to any 
WTP questions, respondents were asked to calculate their annual expenditures on all 
recreational goods; the authors argued that this represented the appropriate "mental 
account" for the given recreational good. Importantly, Bateman and Langford used a 
split-sample design, in which the treatment for the budget constraint question was 
crossed with a number of  other treatments. In the various crossed treatments, results 
always indicated a strong significant positive impact on WTP responses from the 
presence of  the recreational budget constraint treatment. Given significant sample 
mean values for household recreation budgets, the authors considered this to be a plaus- 
ible result. The process of  getting respondents to consider a response to the relevant 
mental account is viewed preferable to simple consideration of  the household budget, 
but a priori will have an uncertain impact on WTP responses. 
Apart from any consideration of  CV surveys,  this theory suggests people tend to sim- 
plify spending decisions by subdividing a larger budget into various "mental accounts." 
Both the sources of  funds and the uses of  funds are labeled in a mental accounting 
system, and individuals may keep fairly rigid barriers between different accounts 
(Thaler, 1985,1990).  Thus, in amental accounting  model, expenditures are  grouped into 
categories, such as for housing, food, etc., and then spending is sometimes constrained 
by these implicit or explicit budgets (Thaler, 1999). The mental accounting model has 
been offered as an explanation for a number of  apparent anomalies in observed consumer 
choice (Thaler, 1990,1999).  The structure of  a mental accounting system may cause an 
individual to frame a decision in a particular way or from a particular reference point, 
and this can be a source of  loss aversion (Magnussen, 1992). Also, the structure of  a 
mental accounting system may violate the principle of  fungibility, causing individuals 
to focus on relative savings (risk) rather than absolute savings (risk) (Duborg, Jones- 
Lee, and Loomes, 1997; Moon, Keasey, and Duxbury, 1999). 
A number of  investigations have considered the effect of  mental accounting on CV 
responses. Specifically, there have been concerns that mental accounting may be the 
source of  a "mental account bias" (Hoevenagel, 1992),  also labeled as a type of  amenity 
misspecification, part-whole bias, or a source of  scope insensitivity (Magnussen, 1992; 
Baron, 1997; Duborg, Jones-Lee, and Loomes, 1997).  However, such accumulated evi- 
dence would not rule out that budget constraint questions help the respondent frame 
a more reasoned CV response, or that a mental accounting framework appropriately 
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Mental accounting only becomes linked to possible amenity misspecification when: 
(a)  the respondent is employing a mental accounting system, and (b)  there is some 
misunderstanding or miscommunication  in the  structured CV conversation between sur- 
veyor(~)  and respondents. Thus, it is appropriate to keep the idea of mental accounting 
conceptually distinct from amenity misspecification (Magnussen, 1992). 
Further, the general notion of  mental accounting need not be inconsistent with a 
model of consumer choice. For example, Magnussen (1992) and Bateman and Langford 
(1997) note that mental accounting is reminiscent of the idea of two-stage (or n-stage) 
budgeting. To make this connection more explicit, it is helpful to appeal to consumer 
theory and the case of  implicit separability and two-stage budgeting. The notion of 
separability  requires goods to be partitioned in an  individual's utility function, such that 
preferences within a group can be described independently of the  level of goods in other 
groups (i.e., through a sub-utility function). While conceptually distinct, separability is 
closely related to the  notion of two-stage budgeting. In  the  latter,  individuals are  viewed 
as allocating their income in a hierarchical decision process, such as  a two-stage process 
where budget proportions are first allocated to broad commodity groups (food, enter- 
tainment, environmental causes) and then to individual commodities (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980). So in the environmental valuation literature, two-stage budgeting 
is consistent with the general notion of  mental accounts (Magnussen, 1992), where 
individuals might be viewed as having a broad expenditure group budget for outdoor 
recreation, or environmental public goods (Bateman and Langford, 1997). The impli- 
cation is that CV surveys could include direct questions about discretionary income or 
budget constraints for broad expenditure groups, as done by Bateman and Langford. 
This discussion motivates the experimental design and testing strategy for budget 
constraint effects pursued in this study. Broadly construed, implementing the notion of 
mental accounts for expenditure categories or discretionary purposes by actively 
pursuing this information in a CV  survey might encourage respondents to further 
consider meaningful budget constraints in giving WTP responses. Such questions must 
be treated as a split-sample informational treatment whose effect can be tested on WTP 
responses. 
The Data and Experimental Design 
In order to implement our testing strategy, we use a data set including matching 
telephone and Internet survey samples (Berrens  et  al., 2003,2004). The first sample  was 
collected by a telephone survey (TEL) in January 2000, which was conducted by the 
Survey Research Center of  the Institute for Public Policy at the University of  New 
Mexico. This survey used a random digital dialing (RDD) approach; 1,699 respondents 
completed the survey, yielding a response rate of  45.6%. In November 2000, a 
probability-based, Internet survey sample was conducted by Knowledge Networks 
(KN).4  KN uses Web TV  technology given to the  respondents recruited through RDD for 
4The  complete data set  includes two other large national Internet samples using the Harris Interactive pre-recruited panel, 
which is non-probability based. For full details of these multi-mode survey samples, see Berrens et al. (2003). The experi- 
mental design included two other split-sample treatments not used here, and analyzed elsewhere (see Berrens et al., 2004; 
Li et al., 2004). Li et al.  Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  355 
this Internet sample of data; 2,162 respondents completed the survey, yielding a 24.1% 
response rate.5 
We focus on a mental accounts treatment, with both the TEL and KN samples. The 
absence or presence of the mental account treatment is identified by an indicator vari- 
able,  MA. Specifically,  a split-sample design was used to randomly divide the respondents 
into those who received the mental accounts treatment (MA = 1)  and those who did not 
(MA = 0). Respondents under the mental accounts treatment received two questions in 
the following order: 
QA:  Now think about your average monthly income and expenses. After you have paid all the 
necessary bills for  such things as housing, transportation, groceries, insurance, debt, and 
tws,  what percent of your income is left over for  optional uses on things like recreation, 
savings, and giving for  charity and other causes? 
QB:  Now think about the  portion ofyour total income available for  optional uses. On  average, 
what percent of that amount do you  use for  contributions to environmental causes, such as 
donations for  specific  programs or contributions and memberships to environmental advocacy 
groups? 
Thus, respondents under this treatment are encouraged to construct their mental 
accounting system into income paid for necessary bills (main expenses) and income left 
over for optional uses. Considering income left for optional uses leads to the  first-stage 
budgeting (QA), while taking into account the income available for contributions to 
environmental causes leads to the second-stage budgeting (QB). Descriptive statistics 
for the budget questions are  provided in table 1,  broken out by the samples for the two 
survey modes-telephone  and Internet (Knowledge Networks). 
With respect to the valuation portion of  the survey, all respondents were provided 
with a standard reminder of  budget constraints, within the context of  the valuation 
question itself. Specifically,  the  valuation question uses an  advisory referendum format: 
Suppose that a national vote or referendum were held today in which U.S. residents could 
vote to advise their Senators whether to support or oppose ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. If  U.S. 
compliance with the treaty would cost your household t dollars per year in  increased energy 
and gasoline prices, would you vote for  or against having your Senators support ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol? Keep in mind that t dollars spent on increased energy and gasoline 
prices could not be spent on other things, such as other household expenses, charities, 
groceries, or car payments. 
For  R  Against  O  Don't KnowINo Answer  O 
Given concerns about potential bias due to the relatively low response rate, we also estimated a full set of matched KN 
models with weights. Results are consistent with raw data estimations, and are available from the lead author upon request. 
For the KN sample, a "raking"  weighting procedure (conducted by Knowledge Networks) was used based on known demo- 
graphic marginals for 32 variables, and corrections  for any sample selection  bias. A comparison of raw and weighted data for 
the KN sample (and all samples) in the overall study is provided in Berrens et al. (2003). Further, in a mixed-mode data set 
comparable to ours, Krosnick and Chang (2001) statistically compare a national RDD  telephone sample, Harris Interactive 
sample, and KN sample. They conclude,  "Internebbased data  collection  represents a viable approach to conducting  represent- 
ative sample surveys" (p. 81, especially  when Internet-based data collection was initially based on RDD  recruiting (as  in the 
KN sample). In comparing unweighted data against U.S. Census Bureau demographic  characteristics, there were no clear 
differences  between the telephone and KN samples. Finally, respondents' lack of interest or familiarity with a topic can be 
a source of  relatively low  response rates. However, some recent research (Pineau and Slotwiner, 2004) indicates that 
increasing the response rate does not have a significant effect on analysis outcomes ifthe  nonresponse rate is less than 80%, 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Budget Constraint Questions 
Means, by Survey Mode 
[N = overall survey responses, and 
n = usable responses to question1 
Knowledge 
Telephone (TEL)  Networks (KN) 
Budget Question  Sample [N = 8651  Sample [N = 1,0501 
QA:  Percentage of household income available for total  18.62%  17.29% 
discretionary uses per month  [n = 7911  [n = 9601 
QB:  Percentage of household income available for  1.66%  2.07% 
environmental causes per month  [n = 7051  [n = 9471 
Notes: The nonresponse rate ((1  - (nlN))  *loo)  for QA and QB for theTEL sample is 8.5% and 18.5%,  respectively; 
and 8.6% and 9.2%, respectively, for the KN sample. One possible reason for no comparable drop in  response rate 
on QB for the KN sample is because QA and QB  were presented on one webpage. While we use the notion of 
mental accounting to motivate this exploration,  we do not know the exact mental accounffs)  individual respondents 
may be using (i.e., whether and what they consider discretionary income or income available for environmental 
causes). So their answers, and choice to respond, to questions QA and QB may depend on their status, interests, 
and familiarity with the budgeting process, as well as their understanding of  the questions. 
The payment amounts (PAY) were randomly allocated within a set oft ($) = {6,12,25, 
75, 150,225, 300, 500, 700, 900, 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400) dollars. 
Modeling Considerations and Hypotheses 
Recoding Voting Responses for Uncertainty 
Respondents' certainty levels in the referendum voting decision may differ greatly 
because of differences in the strength of their preferences, familiarity with the Kyoto 
Protocol, etc. Further, Berrens et al. (2002) and others have identified an apparent 
pattern in dichotomous choice CV formats where "No" means "No," and 'Yes" often 
means only "Maybe." Given these concerns and potential yea-saying (Blarney, Bennett, 
and Morrison, 1999) or upward hypothetical bias, we follow the general approach of 
Champ and Bishop (1997,2001),  Loomis and Ekstrand (1998),  Berrens et  al. (20021, and 
others in recoding selected Yes votes. Such recoding is based on responses to a follow-up 
question concerning the certainty level of  their answers to the referendum question. 
That is, after respondents answered the advisory referendum question, a follow-up 
question was asked as to how certain their voting decisions were on a scale from 0 to 
100, with 0 meaning absolutely certain of voting against it and 100 meaning absolutely 
certain of voting for it. Two separate recoding strategies are implemented in the study. 
A first recoding threshold is set at  50 (R50); i.e., only the Yes votes with a score of 50 
and above were treated as Yes votes (and all other votes are No). This mild recoding is 
expected to filter any "noise" caused by confusion or misunderstanding (e.g., a Yes vote 
that is more certain of being a No gets recoded as a No). A second (separate)  recoding 
threshold is set at  70 (R70), so that only relatively certain Yes votes are included; i.e., 
only Yes votes with a score of 70 and above were treated as  Yes votes (all other votes are 
No). Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  357 
Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables used in various models are classified into two groups: socio- 
economic variables, and Kyoto Protocol-related variables. The socioeconomic variables 
include respondent's annual household income (LINC),  education level (EDUC),  ideology 
(IDEO),  respondent' age (AGE 1, and indicator variables of respondent's gender (MALE) 
and environmental group membership (MEMBER). Variables relevant to the Kyoto 
Protocol include two attitudinal variables, respondent's attitude toward international 
treaties (INTRTY) and environmental problems (BRINK); one knowledge variable, 
respondent's  knowledge about greenhouse gases (GRGAS); and two assessment 
variables, the effectiveness (CONFID) and the fairness (FAIR) of  the Kyoto Protocol. 
Detailed definitions and the associated sample statistics are provided in table 2, parti- 
tioned by samples (TEL and KN) and treatments (MA = 0  and MA  = 1). 
We expect a priori that explanatory  variables ofLINC,  INTRTY, BRINK, and GRGAS 
will positively influence the voting decision-because  the Kyoto Protocol is an inter- 
national treaty (related to INTRTY) of  limiting greenhouse gas emissions (related to 
GRGAS) to handle an  important global environmental  problem (related to BRINK). The 
more the respondents understand the Kyoto Protocol, and the greater their concern 
about environmental problems, the more likely they would vote for the treaty. We also 
anticipate the more positively the respondents assess the Kyoto Protocol (CONFID and 
FAIR), the more likely they would favor the treaty. 
WTP Modeling 
The modeling approach follows the conventional referendum CV model of Cameron and 
James (1987) to directly estimate a household WTP function (separately for both raw 
and recoded data). We begin with the underlying WTP function: 
where xi  is a vector of  the selected explanatory variables of  respondent i, P is the esti- 
mated coefficient of corresponding  explanatoryvariables, a is avariance parameter, and 
ei is a random error component with mean zero. 
Since we cannot detect WTP responses directly in the referendum format, the latent 
function of  an individual's true WTP can be observed by a discrete indicator variable, 
Wi, where 
(2)  Wi  = 1  if  WTPi 2 ti; Wi  = 0  otherwise, 
and ti  is the payment amount randomly assigned to respondent i. Thus, the probability 
of  a Yes response is specified as: 
Based on the assumption of  a lognormal distribution of  the error term ei, a probit 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics:  Means and (Standard  Deviations) for Selected 
Variables, by MA Treatment 
TEL Sample  KN Sample 
[N = 7961  [N = 1,2251 
MA=o  MA=1  MA=o  MA=1 
Variable  Description  [N = 4101  [N = 3861  [N = 6351  [N = 5901 
MA  Indicator variable of mental accounts treatment:  0.00  1.00  0.00  1.00 
1  = mental accounts; 0 = only received standard  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
reminder treatment 
PAY  Randomly assigned payment amount ($), ranging 
from: 6, 12,25,  75,150,225,300,500, 700,900, 
1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 dollars 
EDUC  Education level indicator variable, 1-7 scale: 
1  = less than high school, 5 = college graduate, 




Respondent's age in years1100 
Respondent's gender: 1  = male; 0 = female 
Respondent's attitude toward the relationship 
between environmental threats and human 
civilization,  0-10 scale: 0 = no real threat to 
civilization; 10 = human civilization is on the 
brink of  collapse due to environmental threats 
ZNTRTY  Respondent's view of international treaties as a 
way to handle environmental problems, 0-10 
scale: 0 =very bad idea; 10 = very good idea 
CONFID  Respondent's assessment of  the effectiveness of 
the Kyoto Protocol, 0-1 scale: 0 = certain of no 
effect; 10 = certain to reduce global warming 
GRGAS  Whether the respondent believes greenhouse 





Perceived fairness of  the Kyoto Protocol, 0-10 
scale: 0 = completely unfair; 10 = completely fair 
Political ideology index, 1-7  scale: 1  = strongly 
liberal; 7 = strongly conservative 
Indicator variable for whether respondent 
is member of  an environmental group: 
1  = yes; 0 = no 
LZNC 
VYES 
Logarithm term of respondent's annual household 
income ($1,000~) 
Indicator variable for whether respondent would 
vote for Senate ratification of Kyoto Protocol: 
1  = yes; 0 = no 
CERT  Respondent's reported certainty level of hidher 
voting decision, 0-100  scale: 0 = absolutely certain 
to vote against the Kyoto Protocol; 100 = 
absolutely certain to vote for the Kyoto Protocol Li et al.  Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  359 
For the estimated models, goodness-of-fit is measured by McFadden7s  likelihood-ratio 
index (LRI) (McFadden, 1974; Greene, 2000). 
For the models using recoded voting responses, we construct another index variable 
Wit. The respondent must answer Yes to the referendum question (Wi = 1)  and provide 
a follow-up certainty level (Ci)  which is greater than the threshold certainty value of  50 
or 70 in order for Wil = 1. Then, parallel to the DC model using the raw voting responses, 
the individual's WTP must be inferred through the recoded indicator Wit: 
lifWTP21 and  Ci>R; 
W.'  = 
0 otherwise, 
where R is the recoding threshold (R50 or R70). Given the same distribution of the error 
term, the log-likelihood function of  the recoded model is the same as in (4). 
Finally, because mean WTP estimates can be very sensitive to outliers and the 
distributional assumption, we focus on the more robust median WTP, where median 
WTP, = exp(P1%),  and xi  is replaced with its mean, t  (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999). 
The standard error of median WTP is calculated using the delta method (Greene,  2000). 
Hypotheses 
A series of hypotheses can now be put forward. First, prior to examining the WTP models, 
we investigate whether the standard reminder (MA = 0) versus the mental account 
treatment (MA  = 1) (i.e., absence or presence of  the two questions on discretionary 
budget) is significantly  related to a respondent's voting decision. Hypothesis  H, is tested 
against the null of  no effect: 
H,:  MA  = 0 vs. MA  = 1. The mental account treatment is significantly related 
to the voting decision. 
A nonparametric Mantel-Hanzael x2 test is implemented, and it is expected that the 
evidence will support H, (a significant treatment effect). 
Based on our WTP modeling strategies, the following hypotheses are tested across the 
models using both raw and recoded responses (R50 and R70, separately). To start, we 
directly test for a mental account treatment effect (the presence of  a latent structural 
break between vectors of  estimated coefficients under the MA = 0 control group and the 
MA  = 1  treatment group). Hypothesis H2 is tested against the null that the vectors of 
coefficients are the same, i.e., P"=O  = P"=': 
MA=1 
H,:  P"=O  z Pi  .  The coefficients on MA  = 0 and  MA  = 1  are not equal. 
To examine whether a mental accounts treatment effect exists, a likelihood-ratio  test 
is applied. We expect to reject the null. 
Assuming a significant mental accounts treatment effect is found (i.e., the evidence 
supports H, and H,), then the question is whether this translates into significant differ- 
ences in median annual household WTP estimates. Let wTPMA=O  and wTPMA=l  be the 
median WTP under the MA  = 0 and MA = 1  treatments, respectively. Then the final 
hypothesis (against the null hypothesis of  no difference) tested is: 
H,:  WTPMA=l  c wTPMA=O. 360  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The expectation is that the treatment causes respondents to more directly consider 
discretionary income and any mental accounts, potentially reducing any yea-saying or 
upward hypothetical bias, and that the estimated median WTPMA=l  will be significantly 
smaller than WTPMA=O. 
Results 
Measurement of Association Regarding 
Mental Accounts Effect 
Before proceeding to the WTP modeling results, we investigate whether there exists an 
overall difference in the proportions of No votes between the standard reminder and the 
mental accounts treatments. The payment amount was randomly assigned and is 
negatively (positively) related to the proportion of Yes (No) votes for TEL, KN, and 
pooled samples across the raw and recoded data (R50 and R70). Further, along with 
using the median WTP estimator, using the recoded responses helps to mitigate a "fat 
tail" problem (high acceptance rate at  high payment amounts). For example, the 
percentage of Yes responses at  $2,400 was 35%  for the raw data, it drops to 29% for R50 
responses, and further down to 25% for R70 responses. 
To examine whether the treatment affected voting responses across various payment 
amounts, the TEL and KN data sets are  post-stratified into the standard reminder only 
(MA = 0) and mental accounts (MA = 1) samples. Then we measure the relationship 
between the standard reminder versus mental accounts treatment and respondent's 
voting behavior while controlling for the level of  the payment amount. The Mantel- 
Hanzael x2  values are 6.46 and 4.34 for the TEL and KN data sets, respectively, which 
are both significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, there is a statistically significant 
association  between the presence of the mental accounts  treatment and voting responses 
for these individual data sets. Further, confidence intervals of  the odds ratios are sig- 
nificantly greater than 1, which indicates the respondents who received only standard 
reminders (MA  = 0) are more likely to vote for the treaty. Not surprisingly, these 
relationships are more explicit for the pooled sample. The Mantel-Hanzael x2 value is 
9.79, and is significant at  the 0.01 level. Thus, results support H,. On average, respond- 
ents facing the mental accounts treatment (MA = 1) are less likely to vote Yes, while 
controlling for the level of  the payment amount, and across both survey modes. 
Structural Break Tests Between Treatment 
Samples (MA = 0 versus MA  = 1) 
As developed previously, we  estimate log-probit models using the raw data and two 
recodings (R50 and R70). For each model, a dummy variable (MA) is incorporated to 
indicate the treatment. MA  = 0 and MA = 1  are then estimated separately to further com- 
pare WTP measurements. The results of  these estimations are presented in table 3. 
Before turning to the structural break tests, one can also observe a general 
consistency in the results for the explanatory variables across the various models in 
table 3. For example, the estimated coefficient on the respondent's confidence that the 
Kyoto Protocol would be effective (CONFID)  is positive and significant  in all three models, 
suggesting that the more respondents believe the treaty would reduce global warming, Li  et al.  Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  36 1 
Table 3. Estimation Results of Lognormal Models (with  asymptotic standard 
errors in parentheses) 
MODEL 
Raw Data  R50 Recoded Data  R70 Recoded Data 
Variable  [N = 2,0211  [N = 2,0211  [N = 2,0211 
Intercept  -  11.35***  -9.93***  -11.48*** 












-  Summary Statistics - 
2,521.1  2,034.5  1,987.5  -2 LnL 
-  2 Ln~Restricfed 
(PsbFs = 0)  3,192.3  2,790.7  2,755.5 
McFadden's LRI  0.21  0.29  0.28 
Median WTP ($)  474.14***  92.88***  44.06*** 
(standard error)  (59.89)  (14.98)  (8.91) 
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Table 3. Continued 
MODEL 
Variable 
Raw Data  R50 Recoded Data  R7O  Recoded Data 
[N = 2,0211  [N = 2,0211  [N = 2,0211 
-  Comparison Statistics for MA  = 1  and  MA = 0 - 
Median WTPMA='  ($1  327.15***  59.36***  28.56*** 
(standard error)  (58.28)  (15.24)  (9.38) 
Median WTPMA=O  ($1  647.50***  148.58***  71.18*** 
(standard error)  (116.90)  (30.97)  (17.67) 
t-Value (Median WTPMA=I  VS.  WTPMA=O)  -2.45***  -2.58***  -2.13** 
X2 structure (pMA=I  VS.  PMA*)  34.00***  30.70***  35.00*** 
Notes: 
Single,  double, and triple asterisks (*)denote  statistical significance at  the lo%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Average hi,  is the logarithm likelihood value of restricted function  where all slope parameters equal zero and 
free constant only. 
McFadden's likelihood ratio index (LRI) = 1  - Id, /do. 
Median WTPMA='  and WTPMA=O  are calculated using samples MA = 1  and MA = 0,  respectively, for raw data, 
R50,  and R70  recoded samples. 
The value of the x2  structure test is calculated using MA = 1  and MA = 0  samples, respectively, for raw data, 
R50,  and R70  recoded data. 
the more they would pay for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The estimated coefficient 
on the attitudinal variable GRGAS is also positive and significant in all three models. 
That is, the more the respondents believe the greenhouse gases cause global tempera- 
ture to rise, the  higher their WTP for supporting  the Protocol. Further, higher household 
income (LINC), and being an environmental group member (MEMBER) will lead to a 
higher probability of  voting Yes, and WTP for supporting the Protocol. 
Different sets of  estimated coefficients are used to investigate the mental account 
treatment effect (structural break tests).  As reported in the bottom section of table 3, the 
results of  the log-likelihood ratio test are 34, 31, and 35 for the raw, R50, and R70 
samples, respectively, and X2 statistics are all significant at the 0.01  level. Results indi- 
cate an overall structural break in the MA  = 0 and MA  = 1  samples. The MA  treatment 
influences respondents'voting decision substantially. The results are also supported by 
the estimated coefficient of  MA  (Pm),  which is significant at the 0.01 level in all three 
rnodel~.~  Thus, evidence from the WTP models shows that respondents in the treatment 
group (MA = 1)  have significantly different voting behavior. 
Comparison of  Estimated Median WTP 
We now want to examine whether the significant  treatment effect translates into signif- 
icant differences in median WTP estimates (bottom section of  table 3). For MA  = 0, 
respondents are simply reminded of their budget in general. Results indicate that esti- 
mated WTPMA=O  values are always larger relative to values from models using different 
'  We  also estimated a set of  matched models using TEL  and KN samples separately. The quantitative  results are largely 
consistent with the pooled sample estimations presented here. Results are available from the lead author upon request. Li et al.  Testing  for Budget Constraint Effects  363 
budget constraints for all of  the three models. Since P,,  is significantly negative, the 
mental account treatment is expected to produce smaller WTP estimates-but  the inter- 
esting issue is the magnitude and significance of  such differences. For the model using 
the raw data, the median annual household WTP for the U.S. Senate ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol for the treatment group ($327)  is 50% smaller than for the control group 
($647).  For the models using the recoded responses, the median annual household WTP 
for the treatment groups is even lower (60%)  for the ratification by the control group 
($59 vs. $148 for R50, and $29 vs. $71 for R70). The one-tailed t-test results support H, 
(0.05 level). Across the three models (for the raw, R50, and R70 samples), the average 
median WTPMA='  ranges from approximately 50%  to 60%  less than median WTPm=O.  In 
summary, results suggest a mental account treatmentasking respondents about their 
discretionary incom+would  decrease estimated median WTP signifi~antly.~ 
Discussion and  Conclusions 
As with assessing other significant  changes for complex environmental goods, consider- 
ation of the economic costs and benefits of reducing global climate change will continue 
to be an important informational input to planning and decision making. To the extent 
that  bringing the United States  back into serious  international  negotiations  may greatly 
impact the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol (or some variant thereof), then information on 
U.S. household preferences remains policy relevant. 
This study uses a unique combination of mixed-mode (telephone  and Internet) samples 
to explore the effects of  a mental accounts-type  treatment on U.S. household referendum 
voting (and annual WTP) for ratification of  the Kyoto Protocol. The treatment consists 
of  two questions related to discretionary income (respondents are also provided with a 
standard budget reminder immediately prior to the referendum questions). In the 
control group,  respondents are only provided with the standard budget reminder of their 
household income. Results of  our study suggest that the presence of  a mental accounts 
treatment, where respondents are asked to provide two categories of discretionary 
income, has a significant effect on voting responses. Nonparametric tests suggest the 
treatment significantly lowers the probability of Yes votes on the advisory referendum. 
Further, the WTP modeling results indicate the presence of a structural  break under the 
treatment; using the mental account information (MA  = 1  model) always produces a 
significantly lower estimate of  median annual household WTP (ranging from 50% to 
60%, across the raw and recoded data). 
From a methodological perspective, using mental accounting-type questions appears 
to hold considerable promise for mitigating potential yea-saying  or upward hypothetical 
bias. As a final caveat, in an extended version of  this paper (available from the authors 
upon request, and see Li, 2003), we have explored using the monetary information on 
budget proportions from the treatment questions (QA and QB) explicitly in WTP 
modeling. These efforts include implementing the Beta model (Haab and McConnell, 
1998)  where proportional budget information can be directly used, and ad hoc restric- 
tions on the upper limit of  integration for the WTP distribution. However, such efforts 
'We  also compared the estimated median WTPMA="  and WTPMA='  based on individual sample means of MA =  0 and MA = 1, 
respectively. The t-statistics again support H,  (0.01 level, one-tailed t-test). Results are available from the lead author upon 
request. 364  August 2005  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
are limited in that we do not know the exact mental account (e.g.,  total income, discre- 
tionary income, income available for environmental causes, etc.) any individual may be 
using in the referendum vote (with the given payment vehicle). Thus, we focus here on 
strict tests of the effect of introducing the treatment. Future research may be extended 
by elicitations that explicitly map both the respondent-articulated  mental account and 
a valuation response. 
[Received  February 2005;$nal  revision received May 2005.1 
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